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158 abstract
This article is a preface to a special issue of Financial Theory and Practice, which 
is devoted to the comparison of tax wedge on labour income in Croatia and other 
EU countries. The articles in this issue have arisen from the students’ research 
project, undertaken in 2015. This Preface outlines the motivation behind the re-
search project, explains the most important methodological issues, and reviews 
the literature on the measurement of tax wedge in Croatia. 
Keywords: tax burden, personal income tax, social insurance contributions, family 
benefits, microsimulation, Croatia, EU
1 IntRoDUctIon
This volume of Financial Theory and Practice (FTP) represents a collection of 
papers dealing with the tax burden on labour income that arose from a students’ 
research project. Namely, in 2015 four students from the Department of Mathe-
matics (Faculty of Science, University of Zagreb) participated in a research pro-
ject with the main goal to compare the Croatian tax burden on labour income for 
different hypothetical units with that in other EU countries. Previous studies deal-
ing with tax burden indicators for Croatia mainly focus on the tax wedge of a 
“single average worker”, and compare it with the tax wedge in OECD countries. 
All of them repeatedly conclude that Croatia belongs to the group of countries 
with a moderate tax wedge.1 
In light of that, the main research issue addressed within this students’ research 
project was to inspect whether the conclusion that Croatian tax burden was mod-
erately high holds in the case of other hypothetical units as well, such as singles 
with different levels of gross wage, or singles and couples with children. To do so, 
all students were given the following tasks: (a) to analyse the systems of labour 
income taxation in Croatia and four selected EU countries; (b) to build a micro-
simulation model for hypothetical units across selected countries, which calcu-
lates the amounts of personal income tax (PIT), social insurance contributions 
(SICs), other taxes on labour, and cash family benefits; (c) to compute the tax 
burden indicators, such as the net average tax wedge and net personal average tax 
rate, according to the Taxing Wages methodology (OECD, 2014); and (d) to com-
pare tax burdens across the selected countries.
All students’ works were expertly mentored by Katarina Ott (Chief Editor of the 
FTP) and Ivica Urban (Guest Editor of this volume), both lecturers of Public Sector 
Economics at the Faculty of Science. Following the research plan, students wrote 
their graduation papers, which were successfully defended in the summer of 2015. 
Satisfied with the quality of papers and aware of the recurring importance of the 
1 “Single average worker” is the abbreviation for the most often used hypothetical unit – a single person without 
children, whose gross wage equals the average gross wage in the country of residence. “Tax wedge” denotes 
the ratio between total taxes on labour and total labour cost. Refer to section 3 for precise definitions used in 
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159topic, in late 2015 the mentors decided to prepare these papers for proposal for 
publication in a special issue of FTP. Since graduation papers and journal papers 
do not share the same structure or content, the authors tailored the papers accord-
ing to scientific journal requirements. In this process, some sections were short-
ened and left out, while some were added. Such edited versions were subject to the 
same strict criteria as regular contributed journal submissions and therefore went 
through the standard reviewing procedure (blind review/two reviewers). The pa-
pers significantly benefited from the reviewing process and their final versions are 
presented in this volume.
In line with the aforementioned main research goal, each paper analyses Croatia 
and four other EU countries, which differ across the papers. Thus, the analysis 
embraces a total of 17 countries. Papers are organised in a similar fashion. After the 
introduction and methodology sections, section three contains detailed information 
on tax-benefit instruments of each selected country – SICs, PITs, family cash ben-
efits, etc. These data are primarily based on OECD’s Taxing Wages (OECD, 2014) 
and EUROMOD Country Reports.2 Given all the elements needed to assess income 
taxation, the third section of the papers presents the country’s tax burden indicators 
(net average tax wedge and net personal average tax rate) compared across two 
dimensions: first, for different hypothetical units per country, and second, across all 
analysed countries per household type. It is important to note that the calculations 
follow the methodology determined by OECD (2014), in which the data relate to 
2013. Therefore, Croatian tax burden indicators arise from the 2013 taxation 
scheme no matter the amendments that followed in subsequent years.
This Preface serves as an overture to the results given in the four papers. It reviews 
several recent studies on tax burden comparisons, which cover Croatia (section 2). 
Then, it explains how the sample of countries is selected, and details the methodo-
logical issues concerning the calculation of tax burden indicators (section 3). Spe-
cial attention is given to indicators based on “compulsory payments”, which cover 
both tax and non-tax compulsory payments (section 4).
2 stUDIes of tax weDge: the case of cRoatIa
The tax wedge is continuously in the focus of both academic researchers and 
policy makers in Croatia, particularly in the context of competitiveness and in-
vestment attraction strategies. This section briefly reviews relevant studies that 
measured the tax wedge for Croatia. Its purpose is to acquaint the reader with 
basic and most interesting findings.
Blažić (2006) calculates the tax wedge and its components for the single average 
worker in Croatia in 2005 and compares it with that in OECD countries. With a 
tax wedge of 39.1%, Croatia stood somewhere in the middle of the scale com-
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160 posed of OECD countries. She concludes that PIT accounts for a relatively small 
share of the total tax wedge, while, on the other hand, employee SICs are among 
the highest within the observed countries. Croatia shares common characteristic 
with other European ex-socialist countries, in which the importance of PITs is 
relatively low and the relevance of SICs in the tax wedge is relatively high.
Šeparović (2009) calculates the Croatian tax wedge in 2007 for three single work-
ers without children, who earn a gross wage equal to 67%, 100% and 167% of 
average gross wage, and compares the results with OECD countries. Using the 
cluster and discriminant analysis, the author investigates the relationship between 
the level of tax wedge and unemployment rate. She confirms the results of preced-
ing researches (e.g., Dolenc and Vodopivec, 2005), that a higher tax wedge is re-
lated with higher unemployment rates. Croatia is classified as a member of the 
group of countries with a high tax wedge and a high unemployment rate.
Urban (2009) computes the tax wedge for a wide range of gross wages for a single 
worker without children in Croatia in 2008. He also calculates the marginal tax 
wedge in Croatia, revealing that even for a modestly high gross wage (equal to 3 
average gross wages), the marginal tax wedge reaches 60%, and increases further 
to more than 65% for high gross wages.
The research by Grdović Gnip and Tomić (2010) is the most comprehensive in 
this group. Its methodology is similar to Šeparović’s (2009), but the authors add 
several more features to the analysis. Besides the unemployment rate and tax 
wedge, the list of variables also includes the employment rate and EPL index of 
labour market rigidity. Croatia falls into the cluster group of countries with a high 
tax wedge, low employment rate, high unemployment rate and high labour market 
rigidity. However, the analysis has revealed some interesting results, namely, that 
certain countries achieve high employment rates despite high tax wedges (e.g., 
Scandinavian countries, Germany, Austria, Latvia).
Blažić and Trošelj (2012) report on a debatable practice regarding the application 
of the Taxing Wages methodology when it comes to the measurement of tax burden 
indicators for Croatia. To explain this problematic application, it is necessary to 
briefly explain the Taxing Wages methodology and pension SIC system in Croatia.
According to OECD (2014), tax burden indicators do not include “non-tax com-
pulsory payments”, which are typically related to contributions to social security 
schemes outside the general government sector. Namely, the tax burden should 
cover only the payments to various levels of government, and do not include those 
amounts paid to non-government entities, such as private insurance schemes. Sev-
eral years ago, OECD started to publish compulsory burden indicators, whereby 
“compulsory” means that the burden includes both tax and non-tax compulsory 
payments. This alternative method acknowledges that all mandatory payments – 
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161the employee and the employer.3 Nevertheless, in its basic publication, Taxing 
Wages, OECD presents tax burden indicators.
Following a major reform in 2002, the Croatian pension insurance system intro-
duced two compulsory pillars: the 1st pillar (“intergenerational solidarity”) per-
tains to the general government scheme, while the 2nd pillar (“individual capital-
ised accounts”) relates to private pension funds. As Urban and Bezeredi (2015) 
explain: “Two parallel contributory schemes are created: (a) scheme A, whereby 
persons participate in the 1st pillar only, and (b) scheme B, whereby persons par-
ticipate both in the 1st and the 2nd pillar. Persons who were aged above 50 (below 
40) in January 2002 are automatically involved into scheme A (B), while people 
aged between 40 and 50 could choose whether to become members of scheme A 
or B. People in scheme A pay contributions to the 1st pillar only [pension insurance 
contributions A, or shortly PCA]. Correspondingly, people in scheme A receive 
pension from the 1st pillar only [...]. People in scheme B pay contributions both to 
the 1st pillar [PCB1] and to the 2nd pillar [PCB2].”
The rates for PCA, PCB1 and PCB2 are 20%, 15% and 5% of gross wage, respec-
tively.4 Thus, the overall rate of pension insurance contributions is the same for 
people in schemes A and B, and equals 20%. In terms of OECD methodology, 
PCA and PCB1 are tax payments, and therefore should be included in the calcula-
tion of tax burden indicators. On the other hand, PCB2 represents a non-tax com-
pulsory payment; it pertains to compulsory burden indicators, but not to tax bur-
den indicators.
Thus, one can calculate two sets of tax burden indicators for Croatia: one for persons 
in scheme A and another for those in scheme B, where the indicators will be signifi-
cantly lower for the latter group. Blažić and Trošelj (2012) show that all up-to-date 
measurements of tax burden indicators for Croatia have assumed that the (overall) 
rate of pension insurance contributions is 20%. This may lead to two conclusions: 
(a) researchers have considered only persons pertaining to scheme A; or (b) re-
searchers were considering persons pertaining to scheme B, but have erroneously 
included PCB2 in taxes; however, the exact assumptions are not explicitly stated.
To which group – A or B – should the hypothetical taxpayer belong? Blažić and 
Trošelj (2012) argue that group B should be taken into consideration. Namely, 
OECD methodology implies that younger adult persons should be considered in 
calculations. For example, single persons without children, as one of the main hypo-
thetical taxpayer units, are better represented among younger population; further-
more, children are assumed to be under 12 years of age, which implies that the par-
ents are relatively young. Blažić and Trošelj (2012) calculate several tax burden and 
3 Tax burden indicators are available in OECD (2016c). Compulsory burden indicators are available in OECD 
(2016b; item “B4. Non-tax compulsory payments”).
4 All the mentioned pension contributions are employee SICs. Employer SICs include general health SIC, 
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162 compulsory indicators for the year 2010 and compare Croatia’s results with those in 
OECD countries; they consider the single average worker pertaining to scheme B. 
Since the rate of PCB2 is relatively high, the discrepancies in country ranking ac-
cording to tax burden and compulsory indicators are shown to be significant.
Čok et al. (2013) analyse the tax wedge in the so-called Alps-Adriatic region: Aus-
tria, Croatia, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia. They focus on six hypothetical single 
workers without children. The first one is the single average worker. The remaining 
five earn yearly gross wages of 10, 20, 30, 50 and 100 thousands EUR, respec-
tively. Notice that Čok et al. (2013) combine two different approaches in choosing 
hypothetical units’ gross wages, which can be referred to as the “relative” and 
“absolute”. The “relative” approach considers each country’s average-based wages 
(e.g., 67%, 100% or some other percentage of AGW); this approach is used to de-
fine the “single average worker” (and various other hypothetical units in Taxing 
Wages; see table 2). On the other hand, the “absolute” approach uses equal amounts 
of gross wage in each country; this is the case for units 2 to 6 in Čok et al. (2013).
Čok et al. (2013) show that the ranking of countries can change significantly de-
pending on the choice of reference gross wage in the calculation of the tax wedge. 
Thus, when the “relative” approach is considered, the lower-wage countries (Croa-
tia, Hungary and Slovenia) have a lower tax wedge than higher-wage countries 
(Italy and Austria). However, when the tax burden is examined according to the 
“absolute” approach, it is the other way around – Italy and Austria are shown to have 
a lower tax wedge at all gross wage levels than Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia.5
Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2014) analyse recent developments in the Croatian 
tax system. They conclude that, in comparison with countries that have a similar 
GDP per capita, Croatia has excessive overall tax burden. Being aware of the 
relatively high tax burden on labour income, the Croatian government has de-
creased the rate of general health SIC, from 15% to 13% (in May 2012); however, 
thanks to a significant fall in revenue and a rising deficit, the old rate was reintro-
duced only 23 months later. The authors also discuss the change in PIT law from 
March 2012, and conclude that its impact is dubious; the same can be said about 
the frequent changes in the SICs law. Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2014) also 
compare the tax wedge for single average workers in Croatia and EU countries, 
showing that the Croatian tax wedge is relatively high.6 Furthermore, they com-
pute the tax wedge in Croatia for a large range of gross wages and different time 
periods from 2011 to 2015. In conclusion, the authors state that the tax policy in 
Croatia suffers from frequent changes, lack of coordination between different 
government bodies, and inadequacy of policy measures.7
5 For Croatia, Čok et al. (2013) assume that hypothetical units belong to “group A”, i.e. they pay PCA.
6 Deskar-Škrbić and Šimović (2014) are aware of the suggestions proposed by Blažić and Trošelj (2012). 
Effectively, they analyse the worker from “group A” (who pays PCA).
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1633 the saMPle of coUntRIes anD MethoDologY
3.1 selecteD coUntRIes
As noted in section one, each author’s country sample includes Croatia and four 
other EU countries, making a total of five countries per paper. Thus, the overall 
number of countries covered in the sample across all four papers is 17. As men-
tioned earlier, the Taxing Wages publication is the main reference when assessing 
tax burden indicators. Issued by the OECD, this publication covers only OECD 
members. Since the research project puts EU in the focus, it was necessary to 
choose among those EU countries that were also members of the OECD. There-
fore, non-OECD EU members excluded from the analysis are Bulgaria, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Romania, while OECD and EU members that did not 
enter the project sample are Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom. 
Countries are chosen with regard to the loosely defined criterion of geographical 
closeness to Croatia and their list is presented in table 1.8 
Table 1
Countries included in the sample
Included
Beketić (Croatia), the Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Slovenia
Cundić (Croatia), Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain
Gabrilo (Croatia), Belgium, Estonia, Germany, the Slovak Republic
Onorato (Croatia), Austria, Greece, Hungary, Poland
not included
OECD Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden, United Kingdom
non-OECD Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania
Source: Author’s systematisation.
It is obvious that selected countries significantly differ by the level of economic 
development. Such differences can be simply shown by comparing the annual 
average gross wages from 2005 to 2014 for sample countries (figure 1). The coun-
tries can be divided into three groups: high-, middle- and low-wage countries. The 
high-wage group consists of old EU member states: Ireland, the Netherlands, Bel-
gium, Austria, Germany and France. The middle-wage group comprises economi-
cally “less successful” old EU member states: Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal, 
plus Slovenia. The low-wage group contains several “new” EU member states: 
Estonia, Croatia, the Slovak Republic, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. 
All three groups experienced an increase of the gross wage in 2014 with respect 
to 2005, by 22%, 16% and 40%, respectively. Note that, for diversity reasons, 
each author’s sample includes at least one high-wage country (table 1).
8 However, the selection was not done systematically. Since various Croatian analysts tend to compare Croatia 
with Ireland, the latter country has been substituted for one of the less distant (e.g., Luxembourg). The objec-
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164 Figure 1
Nominal average annual gross wage in selected countries for the period 2005-2014 







2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Ireland Netherlands Belgium Austria Germany France
Italy Spain Slovenia Greece Portugal Estonia
Croatia Slovak R. Czech R. Poland Hungary
Source: Author’s calculation based on OECD (2016a) (for OECD countries) and CBS (2016) 
(for Croatia).
3.2  MethoDologIcal fRaMewoRK foR the calcUlatIon  
of tax weDge InDIcatoRs
As noted in section one, when assessing the tax burden indicators the authors fol-
low the methodology described in the Taxing Wages publication (OECD, 2014). 
This subsection provides a non-exhaustive explanation of the most important is-
sues which relate to the definition of hypothetical units, obtaining the average gross 
wage for hypothetical workers, and the definition of tax- vs. non-tax payments.
All calculations in this volume are done for eight OECD-defined hypothetical 
units, presented in table 2. The labour income of hypothetical adult members is 
defined in reference to the tailor-made definition of the average gross wage 
(AGW) which does not capture all workers in one economy, but only those in 
certain sectors. For Croatia, AGW equals 12 times the weighted average monthly 
wage of workers employed in sectors B to N, according to NACE Rev. 2.9 Two 
studies (Gabrilo and Onorato) introduce additional hypothetical units, whose 
gross wage range extends to 400% of AGW. 
9 CBS (2016) publishes average gross wages across different sectors for workers employed by legal entities. 
AGW is obtained as a weighted average of gross wages across sectors B to N, where the number of workers 
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165Table 2




of dependent  
children
spouse I’s  
gross wage
(% agw)
spouse II’s  
gross wage
(% agw)
A-67-NC Single 0 2/3 x 100 –
A-100-NC Single 0 100 –
A-167-NC Single 0 5/3 x 100 –
A-67-2C Single 2 2/3 x 100 –
2A-100/0-2C Couple 2 100 out of work
2A-100/33-2C Couple 2 100 1/3 x 100
2A-100/67-2C Couple 2 100 2/3 x 100
2A-100/33-NC Couple 0 100 1/3 x 100
Notes: AGW – average gross wage, according to Taxing Wages methodology; in abbreviations, 
“A” stands for “adults”, “C” for children and “NC” for “no children”.
Source: Author’s systematisation.
Although Taxing Wages (OECD, 2014) presents various tax burden indicators, the 
papers in this volume focus on the two main measures: the net average tax wedge 
and the net average tax rate.10 The net average tax wedge is a ratio between total 
net tax and total labour cost. The net average tax rate is the ratio between net 
employee tax and the gross wage.11
Croatia also imposes a local government surtax (prirez), calculated as a percent-
age of PIT obligation. The rates vary across cities and municipalities in the range 
from 0 to 18%. The surtax rate used in all calculations across all the papers of the 
volume is set to 12%, which closely corresponds to the average surtax rate on the 
national level. Regarding the family benefits, “child benefit” is taken into account 
for Croatia; it is a means-tested benefit for families with children.
As noted in section 2, Blažić and Trošelj (2012) have cautioned the researchers 
to properly apply the Taxing Wages methodology regarding the coverage of tax- 
and non-tax compulsory payments. Since the main reference in the research is 
Taxing Wages, all papers in this volume concentrate on tax burden indicators. 
Thus, PCB2 is not included in the tax burden for Croatia. It was also noted that 
OECD now calculates the compulsory burden indicators. One of these indicators 
is the net average compulsory wedge, which is a counterpart of the net average 
tax wedge.12
10 The names of these indicators are slightly changed in comparison to the original names used in Taxing 
Wages. Thus, “net average tax wedge” is a synonym for OECD’s “average tax wedge”, while the term “net 
average tax rate” refers to OECD-s “net personal average tax rate”.
11 Total labour cost is the sum of gross wage, employer SICs and payroll taxes. Total net tax is the sum of all 
SICs, payroll taxes and PIT, minus cash family benefits. Net employee tax is the sum of employee SICs and 
PIT, minus cash family benefits.
12 The term “net average compulsory wedge” used in this paper denotes OECD’s indicator “average compul-
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166 4 the coMPaRIson of net aVeRage tax anD coMPUlsoRY weDges
Blažić and Trošelj (2012) investigate the differences between several tax and com-
pulsory burden indicators for a single average worker, comparing Croatia and 
OECD countries in 2010. In a fashion similar to Blažić and Trošelj’s (2012), this 
section calculates the net average tax wedge and net average compulsory wedge for 
three different hypothetical units defined in table 2. Calculations and comparisons, 
shown in table 3, are carried out for countries analysed in this volume referring to 
the year 2014, but for Croatia results for the years 2013 and 2015 are added.13 
Table 3 
Net average tax wedge and net average compulsory wedge, 2014
a-100-nc a-167-nc 2a-100/67-2c
natw nacw natw nacw natw nacw
% R % R % R % R % R % R
Austria 49.4  2 49.4  4 52.0  4 52.0  5 41.9  5 41.9  6
Belgium 55.6  1 55.6  1 60.8  1 60.8  1 48.4  1 48.4  1
Czech Rep. 42.6  7 42.6  9 45.0 10 45.0 12 35.5 11 35.5 14
Estonia 40.0 13 41.2 11 40.9 14 42.1 15 36.7 10 37.8  9
France 48.4  5 48.4  7 54.3  2 54.3  4 43.7  2 43.7  4
Germany 49.3  3 49.3  5 51.3  5 51.3  6 42.2  4 42.2  5
Greece 40.4 12 40.4 15 48.0  7 48.0  8 41.4  6 41.4  7
Hungary 49.0  4 49.0  6 49.0  6 49.0  7 40.4  7 40.4  8
Ireland 28.2 17 28.2 17 39.6 16 39.6 17 20.3 17 20.3 17
Italy 48.2  6 51.0  3 53.8  3 56.3  2 42.4  3 45.4  3
Netherlands 37.7 14 51.6  2 43.1 13 56.1  3 31.0 15 45.7  2
Poland 35.6 16 40.6 14 36.2 17 41.2 16 32.6 14 37.7 10
Portugal 41.2  9 41.2 12 47.5  8 47.5  9 36.8  9 36.8 13
Slovak Rep. 41.2 10 43.2  8 43.3 12 45.3 11 35.4 12 37.6 12
Slovenia 42.5  8 42.5 10 46.3  9 46.3 10 34.5 13 34.5 15
Spain 40.7 11 40.7 13 45.0 11 45.0 13 37.6  8 37.6 11
Croatia (2014) 36.1 15 40.4 16 40.2 15 44.5 14 30.1 16 34.4 16
Croatia (2013) 35.2 39.5 39.4 43.7 29.2 33.5
Croatia (2015) 35.3 39.6 39.8 44.1 29.4 33.7
Notes: NATW – net average tax wedge, NACW – net average compulsory wedge, “%” – aver-
age wedge as a percentage of total labour cost, “R” – rank.
Source: OECD (2016b), OECD (2016c) and author’s calculation.
Before making a cross-country comparison, let us first focus on Croatian results. 
The average wedges increase between 2013 and 2014 due to the rise of general 
health SIC rate from 13% to 15%. However, the wedges decrease in 2015 due to 
the changes in PIT. Average wedges are roughly the same in 2013 and 2015, at 
least for A-100-NC and 2A-100/67-2C household types. The difference between 
the net average tax wedge and the net average compulsory wedge in all observed 
years and for all hypothetical units is about 4.3 percentage points.
13 The year 2014 is chosen for this analysis due to the availability of information on the OECD website (see 
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167According to the net average tax wedge, Croatia’s tax wedge is one of the lowest 
among selected countries. For A-100-NC and A-167-NC, only Ireland and Poland 
have lower wedges; for 2A-100/67-2C, only Ireland has a lower tax wedge. Turn-
ing to the net average compulsory wedge, Croatia’s ranking only slightly changes. 
For A-100-NC, only Ireland ranks below Croatia, with Poland moving two posi-
tions up. For 2A-100/67-2C the rank of Croatia (and Ireland) does not change. 
Regarding A-167-NC, Croatia moves two positions up, leaving Ireland, Poland 
and Estonia behind.
Concentrating on percentages rather than ranks, the differences between the two 
measures of average wedge are more pronounced. Thus, according to net average 
compulsory wedge, Croatia is much closer to its neighbours on the scale, such as 
Estonia, the Czech Republic, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
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